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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOOOooo 
ROSALEE P. COMER, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
v. ) 
LAWRENCE J. COMER, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
oooOOOooo 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Court of Appeals of the 
State of Utah pursuant to the provisions of Subsection 78-2(a)-
3(2)(h) of Utah Code Annotated and Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding half of the appreciated or accumulated value of property 
inherited by Appellant to Appellee. 
B. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
deducting Appellee's inherited property against Appellant's 
1 
Civil No. 940009-CA 
Priority No. 15 
inherited property when Appellee,s inherited property was 
consumed, co-mingled or contributed to the marital estate. 
C. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
failing to establish Findings of Fact sufficient to support its 
award of alimony to the Appellee. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
There is an issue of fact relating to the sufficiency of the 
Findings of Fact in making an award of alimony. Findings of Fact 
in divorce appeals are subject to the clearly erroneous standard 
of review such that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses," 
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). In the other issues on appeal, the conclusions 
of law are challenged by the Appellant. Accordingly, the 
applicable standard of appellate review is for the correctness 
and the conclusions of the trial are given no special deference. 
Bountiful v. Riley, 784 P.2d 1174, 1175 (Utah 1989); Smith v. 
Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
GOVERNING STATUTE 
The statute which governs this matter is Subsection 30-3-5 
(Utah 1991), which provides in relevant part: 
"When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the 
Court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, debts or 
obligations, and parties." 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of Case: 
This appeal is from those provisions of the Decree of 
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Divorce and the sufficiency of the court's findings which 
ordered Appellee alimony and the correctness of the court's 
finding which ordered the division of certain properties which 
were inherited by the parties during the course of the marriage. 
B. Course of Proceeding: 
The Appellee filed for divorce in April of 1993. The case 
went to trial in the First Judicial District Court before the 
Honorable Ben H. Hadfield on the 20th day of September, 1993. 
C. Disposition of the Court below: 
The Decree of Divorce was signed and entered the 9th day of 
December, 1993. A Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered on 
the 14th day of February, 1994. A Notice of Appeal was filed on 
January 6, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married on October 22, 1959 (Tr. 1-14). 
During the course of the marriage, there have been two (2) 
children born of issue of the marriage, both boys now over the 
age of 18 and emancipated (Tr. 1-29). Appellee is 50 years of 
age (Tr. 1-35). Appellee currently grooms dogs as an occupation 
(Tr. 1-14). Income from dog grooming ranges between $400.00 and 
$450.00 per month (Tr. 1-15). 
Appellee has a work history of being a checker for a grocery 
store and worked as a clerk in a jewelry store (Tr. 1-45). 
Appellee claims that she has a problem with her wrist and a back 
problem. She alleges that this limits what she can earn (Tr. 1-
14, 1-15). Appellee has never made application for disability 
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compensation (Tr. 1-48). 
Appellant has worked at Schreiber's Cheese for 21 1/2 years 
(Tr. 1-78). Appellant earns $10.65 per hour based on a 40 hour 
week and a 52-week year that works out to $22,152.00. 
Appellant, for the year ending 1992, grossed $32,847.00, which 
includes overtime (Tr. 1-72). Based on the gross of $32,000.00 
per year, Appellant, after taking out the deductions from his 
paycheck, has a net of $546.20 every two weeks (Tr. 1-73). 
The parties have a home and real property located at 61 East 
600 North, Logan, UT 84321 (Tr. 1-16). One day after Appellant 
left for work, Appellee, with two friends, removed everything 
from the house that Appellee wanted and moved herself to a new 
place of residence. When Appellant returned home, he found that 
the house had been "trashed" and that Appellee had voluntarily 
moved (Tr. 1-77). Appellee moved to 550 East 600 South, River 
Heights, to live with three separate families (Tr. 1-39). 
Appellee testified on cross-examination that her share of 
monthly expenses included rent of $212.00 per month, $118.00 for 
utilities, $100.00 per month for food, $75.00 per month on 
transportation, $50.00 on medical and dental care, $15.00 per 
week for bowling ($60.00 per month for recreation), and $20.00 
for laundry for a total of $655.00 (Tr. 1-41, 1-42, 1-43, 1-44). 
Appellee on redirect proffered, through her attorney, answer to 
interrogatories listing monthly expenses of $150.00 for food, 
$183.00 for utilities, $100.00 for clothing, $25.00 for laundry 
and dry cleaning, and $150.00 for transportation (Tr. 1-57). 
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Appellee then testified that her transportation costs would not 
be quite $150.00 (Tr. 1-57). Appellee's attorney proffered 
$128.00 for health insurance and $300.00 for upkeep and 
maintenance (Tr. 1-58). Appellee's attorney then asked her if 
she understood the budget then to be $1,413.00, plus $128.00 for 
health care. Appellee answered "Oh, that's—" (Tr. 1-59). 
On recross, Appellee testified that her rental was $212.00, 
her utilities were $125.00, her grocery bill was $100.00, and 
that her laundry and dry cleaning was about $25.00 (Tr. 1-66). 
Appellee then testified that her $300.00 per month upkeep and 
maintenance could probably be put down to $200.00 (Tr. 1-67, 
1-68). Appellee stated, "this is just all a guess" (Tr. 1-66). 
Appellant's monthly living expenses were proffered by his 
attorney into evidence at $1,410.00 per month if he retained the 
family home, and $1,910.00 if the home was sold and he was 
required to rent (Tr. 1-73). 
In January of 1977, Appellant received approximately 
$26,000.00 net inheritance at the death of his mother and father 
(Tr. 1-3). Appellant also received land and apartments in Lehi, 
Utah, which Appellee made no claim to (Tr. 1-83, 1-84). The 
money was placed into two accounts with E.F. Hutton, the "Hutton 
Account" and "First Capital Account" (hereinafter E.F. Hutton 
accounts). E.F. Hutton changed its name to Shearson-Lehman and 
is now Pacific Corinthian (Tr. 1-4). The accounts accumulated 
from $26,000.00 to $45,000.00 (Tr. 1-6). The documentation as to 
the exact amount that was originally placed in the accounts upon 
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the death of Appellants parents was destroyed (Tr. 1-5). 
Appellee testified that the E.F. Hutton accounts were an 
asset of the parties used or relied on as their retirement, and 
that at least one account had Appellee's name on it, that 
Appellant really had no interest in those accounts and that 
Appellee was the one who dealt with the broker and decided where 
to put those investments (Tr. 1-5, 1-6). Appellee testified that 
taxes were paid from earnings accumulated, but no principal or 
interest have been taken out of these accounts and they have been 
frozen for the last ten (10) years (Tr. 1-51). 
Proffer was made on behalf of Appellant that Appellee did 
nothing to enhance the value of the property or contributed to 
its maintenance, that she did nothing to contribute to the 
protection of the property, that the property was not consumed by 
the parties or co-mingled with marital assets, and that the 
Appellant did not make a gift to the Appellee of interest in the 
accounts (Tr. 1-71, 1-72). Appellant testified that it was never 
his intention for these accounts to become marital assets, and 
that the monies were invested directly with E.F. Hutton in tax 
free accounts for retirement (Tr. 1-68, 1-69). 
The Appellee testified that she also received an 
inheritance in the total sum of approximately $8,000.00 
(Tr. 1-33, 1-34). That same money went into savings and paid off 
the parties7 home (Tr. 1-34). The Appellee received the money 
approximately 20 to 21 years ago (Tr. 1-34.) The Appellee then 
testified in cross-examination that she received approximately 
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$7,000.00 tops 20 to 22 years ago (Tr. 1-64). 
The parties had worked out an agreement at a pre-trial 
conference as to the division of the personal property, including 
a fifty/fifty division of checking and savings accounts 
(Pre-trial order - 2) (Tr. 1-22). 
The court stated relative to alimony: 
"I am going to accept the Plaintiff's current earnings 
of $450.00 a month. I think there is some question. 
It certainly could be argued that we should impute at 
least a minimum wage, that she may be able to work 800, 
or earn $800.00 a month. Possibly, it could be argued 
she could work overtime, but I am going to accept the 
$450.00 and say that is her income earning." 
"In regard to the Defendant, it appears to the court 
that his monthly gross, without overtime, is $1,846.00, 
with gross it is just over $3000.00 per month, or with 
overtime, that is. I am going to set the alimony award 
at $750.00 a month. Essentially, that will come very 
close to equalizing of the incomes of the parties, or 
the money of the parties, with the exception of the 
overtime, which I'm sure the Defendant feels that is a 
substantial alimony award, in the court's view is 
leaving most or all of the overtime earnings with the 
Defendant, so I don't think it's all out of line as far 
as the amount (Tr. 1-111)." 
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provide that: 
"Because of the long term marriage and the substantial 
earning capacity differences between the parties that 
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled 
to permanent alimony that shall terminate upon 
Plaintiff's death, remarriage or co-habitation as 
provided by law. The Defendant's gross earnings per 
month are $1,846.00 without overtime, and $3,063.00 
with overtime. The Plaintiff's gross earnings per 
month are $450.00. Taking into consideration 
Plaintiff's and Defendant's regular salaries and the 
needs of the parties, Defendant should pay $750.00 per 
month as for alimony beginning October 1, 1993, with 
one-half payable on the 1st day of the month, and one-
half payable on the 15th day of the month until further 
order of the court." 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law - 2). 
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The court then entered its decision relative to the 
inherited property. The court stated that it was a difficult 
issue and found that there was an estimated original net 
inheritance of Appellant of $26,000.00. The court then took the 
$7,000.00 which the Appellee inherited and deducted it from the 
$26,000.00 which left $19,000.00 from the two accounts, 
$45,000.00 and $19,000.00, which would be first paid to the 
Appellant as separate inheritance and the remaining balance 
would be split equally (Tr. 1-112, 1-113). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Division of Inherited Property 
(a) The trial court abused its discretion in dividing 
appreciated or accumulated value of property inherited by the 
Appellant between the parties. The Utah Supreme Court 
articulated the rules governing the division of inherited 
property in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). 
These generally require, in a divorce, the award to the donee of 
inherited property, including any appreciation or accumulation 
value if it has not been co-mingled, lost its separate identity 
or been enhanced by the efforts of the non-donee spouse, 760 P.2d 
at 308. In this case the Appellant inherited property from his 
parents, to-wit $26,000.00. The interest has accumulated or 
appreciated by $19,000.00 during the marriage making the account 
valued at $45,000.00 at the time of divorce. After Appellant 
received the $26,000.00 from his parents7 estate, Appellant 
immediately took the money and invested it directly with E.F. 
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Hutton into two accounts, "Hutton Accounts" and "First Capital 
Accounts" (hereinafter E.F. Hutton accounts). These same 
accounts have been frozen for the last ten (10) years. During 
the marriage, no principal or accumulated interest has been 
withdrawn from the accounts, they have not been co-mingled with 
any marital assets and the money has not lost its identity 
through exchanges. At no time did the Appellant make a gift to 
the Appellee. 
These factors considered together require this court to 
determine that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing 
the appreciated or accumulated value of the inherited property 
of Appellant between the parties. 
(b) The trial court abused its discretion in crediting 
Appellee $7,000.00, and deducting said $7,000.00 against 
Appellant's inherited property of $26,000.00, when Appellee's 
property was consumed and co-mingled with marital assets. The 
Utah Supreme Court has also articulated the exception to the rule 
governing the division of inherited property in Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). Exceptions to the general 
rule requiring the award of inherited property to the donee 
spouse in a divorce, occur where the property has been consumed, 
co-mingled or lost its separate identity, or has been enhanced by 
the efforts of the non-donee spouse, or has been donated to the 
marital estate, 760 P.2d at 308. In this case, Appellee 
inherited property from her father, to-wit $7000.00; some of 
which was placed in savings, some paid into the home, and the 
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remainder consumed. The trial court abused its discretion in 
deducting Appellee's inherited $7,000.00 against the net 
proceeds of $26,000.00 awarded to the Appellant. 
2. Alimony 
The trial court abused its discretion in making an alimony 
award to the Appellee where the court's Findings of Fact were 
insufficient to support an alimony award. The Utah Court of 
Appeals articulated the criteria in determining alimony in Watson 
v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992), which requires the trial 
court to consider: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving spouse to 
produce sufficient income for him or herself; and (3) the ability 
of the responding spouse to provide support. If these three 
factors have been considered, the appellate court will not 
disturb the trial court's alimony award unless such a serious 
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
In the instance case, the trial court failed to articulate the 
three above factors, and as a result, abused its discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
I. GENERAL RULE INHERITED OR DONATED PROPERTY 
AND ITS APPRECIATED OR ACCUMULATED VALUE BE 
AWARDED TO THE DONEE SPOUSE UNLESS EXCEPTION APPLIES. 
Utah law generally requires the award of inherited or 
donated property, as well as its appreciated or accumulated 
value, to the donee spouse upon a divorce, Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1988). Variation from this rule 
can occur when the inherited property has by the efforts of the 
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non-donee spouse augmented, maintained or protected the inherited 
or donated property, Dubois v. Dubois. 29 Utah 2d 75, 505 P.2d 
1381 (1973); where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the 
property with marital property so that it has lost its separate 
character, Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308; or the 
recipient spouse has contributed all or part of the property to 
the marital estate, Id. 
Proper disposition of property, and its appreciated value, 
brought into the marriage or inherited during the marriage, is 
separate consideration in the division of the property issue 
faced by the court in hearing a divorce. This question has been 
discussed in several Utah cases. They have followed a line of 
progression which culminated in the Mortensen decision which 
establishes rules governing this case. 
In the case at hand, Appellant was bequeathed by his 
parents, during the marriage, the Lehi Apartments and $26,000.00. 
The $26,000.00 was placed with E. F. Hutton into two separate 
accounts where it grew to $45,000.00 at the time of trial. 
Appellee was also bequeathed by her parents, during the marriage, 
$7,000.00. Appellee made no claim to the Lehi properties and 
acknowledged in open court at the divorce trial that they should 
be awarded to the Appellant. The trial court, however, took the 
net $26,000.00 of Appellants inheritance and deducted the 
$7,000.00 of Appellee's inheritance, which left $19,000.00. From 
the balance of the $45,000.00 in the E.F. Hutton accounts, 
$19,000.00 was awarded the Appellant and the remaining amount was 
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split equally between the parties. This decision was an abuse of 
discretion in that it violated the standards and its exceptions 
articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Mortensenr supra, and 
this court: 
"Inherited or donated property, as well as its 
appreciated value, is generally regarded as separate 
from the marital estate and hence is left with the 
receiving spouse in property division incident to 
divorce." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 at 1169 (Utah App. 1990), see also, 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) 
The exceptions to this rule: 
"However, such property may appropriately be considered 
part of the marital estate, subject to division, when 
the other spouse has by his or her efforts, augmented, 
maintained or protected the inherited or donated 
property, where the parties have inextricably co-
mingled the property with marital property so that it 
has lost its separate character, or where the recipient 
spouse has contributed all or part of the property to 
the marital estate." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169 (Utah App. 1990), Mortensen v. 
Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
Because Appellant's inheritance, including the appreciated 
or accumulated value, falls under the general rules and not the 
exception, the appreciated or accumulated value of Appellant's 
inheritance should not have been divided with the Appellee. 
However, because Appellee's inheritance did not fall under the 
general rule, but its exception, Appellee's inheritance should 
not have been deducted against Appellant's net inheritance and 
the remaining portion divided between the parties. 
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Utah courts have addressed the exception in several cases, 
and although they are decided on a case by case basis, the cases 
are weighed in favor of awarding the property to the person who 
inherited it. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), was a case in 
which the wife inherited three and one-half (3 1/2) acres of 
unimproved land from the estate of her mother. No improvements 
were made upon the property and the parties did nothing to 
enhance its value. At the time of the inheritance, the property 
had a value of less than $5000.00. However, at the time of the 
divorce, it had appreciated to a value of $35,000.00 per acre. 
Addressing this issue, the Utah Supreme Court found no error in 
the court's refusal to award the husband any appreciation during 
marriage in the value of the property the wife inherited. The 
court stated that the husband conceded that he made no 
contribution toward the increasing value of the acreage in 
question, and that the income came solely from the efforts of 
inflation on land values. 
Preston v. Preston. 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), was a case in 
which the wife inherited an interest in some farm land. The 
husband performed legal services for the decedent's estate at 
half the regular price, and did some other work on the farm as 
well. When the parties divorced, the wife was awarded the 
property and the husband appealed. Addressing this issue, the 
Utah Supreme Court found no error in the court's refusal to award 
the husband a share of the property the wife acquired as 
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inheritance during the marriage. The court stated that even 
though the husband did some work on the property, the wife's 
inheritance was not acquired through the "joint efforts of the 
parties", 646 P.2d at 706. The husband7 efforts in augmenting, 
maintaining or protecting the inherited property were not 
substantial enough to allow him to be awarded half of the 
inherited property. 
In Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980), the 
court refused to award a greater share of property to the 
husband, even though he performed landscaping and repair projects 
on the home. The wife purchased a mobile home during the 
marriage with her own funds, and despite the husband's 
improvements and maintenance of the home, the divorce court 
awarded him only twenty-three percent (23%) of the profit on the 
home. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING APPELLEE 
HALF OF THE APPRECIATED OR ACCUMULATED VALUE FROM 
APPELLANT'S INHERITED PROPERTY. 
In the case at hand, there is no evidence that Appellant's 
parents left Appellant's inheritance to both Appellant and 
Appellee, or that Appellant wanted to make a gift of part, or 
all, of his inheritance to Appellee, or its appreciated or 
accumulated value. The general rule governing treatment of an 
inheritance in a divorce as stated by the Utah Supreme Court is: 
" . . . preserve and give effect to the right that 
married persons have always had in this state to 
separately own and enjoy property. It also accords 
with the normal intent of donors or deceased persons 
that their gifts and inheritances should be kept within 
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their family and succession should not be diverted 
because of divorce." 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308-309 (Utah 1988). 
The trial court improperly ignored this rule in its 
decision to award Appellee one-half of the appreciated or 
accumulated value in the E.F. Hutton accounts. 
It is undisputed that the $26,000.00 in the E.F. Hutton 
accounts had grown to $45,000.00, or has increased by $19,000.00 
during the course of the marriage. However, Appellee had not 
augmented, maintained or protected this property, or made any 
contribution toward the increase in its value. 
"Of particular concern in a case such as this is 
whether one spouse has made any contribution toward the 
growth of the separate assets of the other spouse and 
whether the assets were accumulated or enhanced by the 
joint efforts of the parties." 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
Appellee assumes that since her name was on one of the 
accounts, and because she dealt with one of E.F. Hutton's 
investment counselors, she claims half of the appreciated or 
accumulated value. The fact that one account was held jointly is 
not conclusive that a gift was made, Jesperson v. Jesperson, 610 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). 
While Appellee concedes that the money has been in the same 
accounts with E.F. Hutton for more than fifteen (15) years, and 
the last ten (10) years the account has been frozen, the trial 
court, nevertheless, awarded Appellee one-half of the appreciated 
value of said E.F. Hutton accounts. The trial court's decision 
contravenes the declaration of the Utah Supreme Court: 
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"Finally, we are mindful that the inclusion of 
inherited property in the marital estate subjects it to 
being removed from the natural line of succession, thus 
thwarting the desires of persons who acquired it and 
passed it on to the spouse in possession. At the same 
time, the spouse who made no contribution to 
acquisition of the property benefits from the windfall 
award." 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988). 
Appellee did not augment, maintain or protect Appellant's 
inheritance in any way, nor did Appellant make a gift to 
Appellee. Appellee has made no contribution toward its growth, 
said growth being a natural accumulation of value during the 
lifetime of the accounts. 
The final exception to apply in this matter involves 
co-mingling of funds: 
"Where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the 
property with marital property so that it lost its 
separate character..." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990), 
and 
"When the property completely loses it identity and is 
not traceable because it is co-mingled with other 
property..." 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988). 
The E.F. Hutton accounts were not co-mingled but are fully 
identifiable and traceable because said accounts were kept 
separate and distinct. No withdrawals of principal or interest 
were ever made from said account since the day it was deposited 
with E.F. Hutton. Although Appellee claims tax paid on personal 
earnings on the E.F. Hutton accounts, said accounts were for 
Appellant's retirement, and were tax exempt. The accounts 
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remained their separate character, have remained identifiable and 
are easily traceable to Appellant's inheritance. 
Simply because interest accumulated or appreciated on the 
account during the marriage, the appreciated or accumulated value 
of the account should not become part of the marital estate in 
which the Appellee would be entitled to a share upon divorce. 
The trial court abused its discretion in determining that the 
appreciated value of the account during the marriage should be 
included as part of the marital estate. The Appellee did not 
maintain or protect the property, nor was there co-mingling of 
the property and no gift of the property was made. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEDUCTING 
APPELLEE'S INHERITED PROPERTY AGAINST APPELLANT'S 
INHERITED PROPERTY CONSUMED, CO-MINGLED OR CONTRIBUTED TO 
THE MARITAL ESTATE. 
From the $7,000.00 bequeathed to Appellee, $2,250.00 was 
paid on the parties7 home, some placed in savings, and the 
remainder consumed by the parties. The exception to the general 
rule provides: 
"Property may be appropriately considered part of the 
marital estate, subject to division, when the other 
spouse has by his or her efforts, augmented, maintained 
or protected the inherited or donated property, where 
the parties have inextricably co-mingled the property 
with marital property so that it has lost its separate 
character, or where the recipient spouse has 
contributed all or part of the property to the marital 
estate." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d at 1169 (Utah App. 1990). 
All or part of the exceptions apply to Appellee's inherited 
property. From Appellee's $7,000.00 inheritance she received 
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from her father, $2,250.00 went into the parties' family home. 
Title to the home was jointly held by Appellant and Appellee. 
The value of the home and was awarded one-half to Appellant and 
one-half to the Appellee. Some of the $7,000.00 was also placed 
into savings, one-half which was awarded to Appellant and one-
half awarded to the Appellee. The remaining portion of the 
monies were consumed by the parties. Clearly, the exception to 
the general rule applies to Appellee's $7,000.00 where it was co-
mingled or consumed in the parties' marital estate. 
"Where the parties have inextricably co-mingled the 
property with marital property so that it has lost its 
separate character..." 
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990), 
and 
"When the property completely loses its identity and 
is not traceable because it is co-mingled with other 
property..." 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988). 
Examination of the decision of the trial court went against 
the governing rules and exceptions applied by Burt v. Burt, 799 
P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah App. 1990) and Mortensen v. Mortensenf 760 
P.2d 304, 307 (Utah 1988). The trial court abused its discretion 
in determining that the exceptions did not apply to Appellee's 
inherited property, and by deducting the $7,000.00 Appellee 
inherited against the net $26,000.00 Appellee inherited. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY FAILING TO ESTABLISH FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ITS AWARD OF ALIMONY 
TO THE APPELLEE. 
The criteria to be used in determining alimony are well 
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established. The Utah Court of Appeals reiterated them in 
Watson v. Watsonf 837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992): 
"In awarding alimony, appellate courts require that the 
trial court consider each of the following three 
factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the 
receiving spouse; (2) the ability of the receiving 
spouse to provide a sufficient income for him or 
herself; and (3) the ability of the responding spouse 
to provide support. If these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's 
alimony award unless such serious inequity has resulted 
as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion." 
"In considering these three factors, the trial court is 
required to make adequate factual findings and all material 
issues, unless the facts in the record are 'clear, uncontroverted 
and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment7", Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 422 (Utah App. 
1990) (Quoting Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 
(Utah App. 1988); (Quoting Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987))). 
The trial court's written findings relative to alimony 
consisted of: 
"Because of the long term marriage and the substantial 
earning capacity differences between the parties that 
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled 
to permanent alimony that shall terminate upon 
Plaintiff's death, remarriage or co-habitation as 
provided by law. The Defendant's gross earnings per 
month are $1,846.00 without overtime, $3,063.00 with 
overtime. The Plaintiff's gross earnings per month are 
$450.00. Taking into consideration Plaintiff and 
Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the 
parties, Defendant should pay $750.00 in alimony 
beginning October 1, 1994, with one-half payable on the 
1st day of each month and one-half payable on the 15th 
of each month until further order of the court." 
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The trial court's oral findings from the bench regarding 
alimony consisted of: 
"With regard to alimony, I want to make a clear record 
of how the court views it, and I recognize that it may 
be viewed differently by various courts. I am going to 
accept the Plaintiff's current earnings of $450.00. I 
think there is some question. It certainly would be 
argued that we should impute at least a minimum, that 
she may be able to work 80, or earn $800.00 a month. 
Possibly, it could be argued that she could work 
overtime, but I am going to accept the $450.00 and say 
that is her income earning." 
"With regard to Defendant, it appears to the court that 
his monthly gross, without overtime, is $1,846.00, with 
gross it is just over $3000.00 per month, or with 
overtime, that is." 
"I am going to set the alimony award at $750.00 a 
month, as such, that will come very close to equalizing 
the incomes of the parties, or the money of the 
parties, with the exception of the overtime, which I'm 
sure the Defendant feels that is a substantial alimony 
award. In the court's view, it is leaving most or all 
of the overtime earnings with the Defendant, and so I 
don't think it's all out of line as far as the amount." 
A. Financial Conditions & the Needs of the Receiving Spouse. 
There are insufficient findings on the first factor, 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse. The 
findings do not determine what Appellee's reasonable and 
necessary expenses are, and the record is not clear. 
B. Ability of Receiving Spouse to Produce Sufficient Income. 
The second factor, Appellee's ability to produce sufficient 
income, is also problematic. The trial court simply accepts 
Appellee's current earnings at $450.00 a month, but fails to 
establish why said sum should be set at $450.00 a month and why 
Appellee was not imputed a minimum wage. The court failed to 
make sufficient findings in light of the testimony that Appellee 
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had worked in the past as a grocery store checker and jewelry 
store clerk, and whether full time employment would be available 
to Appellee if she wanted it, or whether her physical claims of 
disability prevent her from working full time. 
The trial court further failed to take into account 
substantial savings awarded one-half to Appellee and interest 
dividends which could offset Appellee's need for support. 
C. Responding Spouse's Ability to Provide Support. 
The third factor, the Appellant's ability to pay, was 
partially demonstrated through findings on his monthly income. 
However, there are no findings on what his reasonable needs are. 
Examination of the findings made by the trial court relative to 
alimony award was clearly insufficient to allow this court to 
insure that the trial court's discretionary determination was 
rationally based on the three factors and numerated above. 
Findings are adequate only if they are "sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the 
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was 
reached," Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah App. 1988). 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court abused its discretion in awarding Appellee 
one-half of the appreciated or accumulated value of Appellant's 
inheritance acquired during the course of the marriage 
relationship. Utah case law demonstrates that when there is no 
augmentation, maintenance or protection of the inherited property 
by the non-donee spouse, no co-mingling with marital property, 
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and no gift has been made to the non-donee spouse, the inherited 
property, including its appreciated or accumulated value, should 
remain as the property of the donee spouse. However, when the 
property has been co-mingled so that it has lost its separate 
character, or it has been consumed or donated to the marital 
estate, the inherited property should become part of the marital 
estate and divided equally between the parties, as is the case 
with Appellee's inherited property. 
Further, the court abused its discretion in making an 
alimony award by failing to establish Findings of Fact sufficient 
to establish an alimony award. The trial court abused its 
discretion by failing to meet the three factors of: (1) the 
financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income; and 
(3) the ability of the supporting spouse to provide support. 
Failure of the trial court to consider all three factors is an 
abuse of discretion. 
DATED this / day of May, 1994. 
jory JBkabelund ^^ 
Drney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of 
the BRIEF OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Lyle Hillyard 
Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen 
175 East 100 North 
Logan, UT 84321 
DATED this C1 day of May, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
LYLE W. HILLYARD #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHh COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSALEE P. COMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE J. COMER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 924-201 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 20th day o± 
September, 1993, before the Honorable Ben H. Hadfield, District 
Court Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her attorney, 
Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his <ittoin<^ Cregory 
Skabelund. The Court reviewed with the parties the pretrial 
order and the stipulated issues. The parties were sworn and 
testified with proffers of evidence and documents were 
introduced. The Court being fully advised in the premises, 
enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That more than three months have expired since the 
filing of the complaint herein. 
2. That Plaintiff and Defendant are now and have been for 
three months immediately preceding the filing of this action 
residents of the County of Cache, State of Utah. Case No _i?c3 T^D-01 
C a - S1993 Jf /T 
r, lie 
3. That the Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each 
other on the 22nd day of October, 1959, in Elko, Neavda, and ever 
since that time have been and now are husband and wife. 
4. That two children have been born as issue of this 
marriage, however, both are over the age of 18 years and no more 
children are expected. 
5. That during the course of the marriage, irreconcilable 
differences have arisen between the parties making it impossible 
to continue the marriage. 
6. That because of the long term marriage and the 
substantial earning capacity differences between the parties that 
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled to 
permanent alimony that shall terminate upon Plaintiff's death, 
remarriage, or cohabitation, as provided by law. That 
Defendant's gross earnings per month are $1,846 without overtime 
and $3,063 with overtime. That Plaintiff's gross earnings per 
month are $450. Taking into consideration Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the parties, 
Defendant should pay $750 a month as and for alimony, beginning 
October 1, 1993, with one-half payable on the 1st day of the 
month and one-half payable on the 15th day of the month until the 
further order of the Court. 
7. That Plaintiff should have the option to pick up health 
insurance coverage through Defendant's employment under the COBRA 
provision, with her to pay the premiums for that insurance. 
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8. That Defendant should have the option to buy the home of 
the parties located at 61 East 600 North, Logan, Utah, for 
$61,000, with $30,500 payable to Plaintiff within 30 days from 
the date the Decree of Divorce is entered. Defendant may 
subtract therefrom $150 for her share of the appraisal fee 
provided he has paid the appraisal fee of $300 to Jack Draxler. 
9. That Defendant has delivered the 1977 motor home to a 
lot where it can be sold professionally. The Defendant shall 
give the Plaintiff notice of any potential buyer and the money 
offered before he consummates the sale. The net proceeds from 
the sale shall be equally divided between the parties. 
10. That all bank accounts and investments, including IRA, 
credit union, and money market funds, except the Hutton and First 
Capital accounts referred to in paragraph 13, acquired by the 
parties during their marriage should be divided equally, taking 
into consideration previous divisions made and the best tax 
implications of those divided. This shall include any other cash 
that may be located by the parties. 
11. That the Plaintiff should be awarded the 1978 GMC 
truck, her diamonds, and the items listed on Exhibit "A" attached 
hereto, with Plaintiff to make available to the Defendant the 
crystal and cedar chest now in her possession. Plaintiff should 
come to the family home on September 25, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. to 
pick up the items on Exhibit "A". 
12. That the Defendant should be awarded the 1978 Jeep, the 
crystal that he inherited from his mother, the cedar chest, his 
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mother's diamond that is on one band, with the other two bands 
that make the set going to the Plaintiff, his interest in the 
land and improvements in Lehi, Utah, and, the items in his 
possession except those that are awarded to the Plaintiff. 
13, That the parties have acquired during their marriage a 
Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate 
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's 
inheritance. Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from 
her family during the course of the marriage which was invested 
in marital assets. Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant 
with $19,000 in these accounts and the balance of these two 
accounts shall be split between the parties. The Court noted 
that these accounts have been held by the parties for 
approximately 16 years. The accounts have been managed by both 
of parties while owned. Plaintiff's name was on one account. 
The parties have paid taxes generated on the interest from these 
investments from their marital assets, thus converting the 
accumulation in these accounts into marital assets. 
14. That Plaintiff should be awarded a one-half interest in 
any and all retirement and profit sharing plans which Defendant 
may have through his employment at Schreiber Foods acquired 
during their marriage. Plaintiff's one-half interest shall be 
computed in accordance with the so-called Woodward formula as set 
out in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). In 
addition, Plaintiff is awarded survivor benefits at least 
equivalent in amount to her retirement interest awarded herein, 
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the cost of said benefits to be paid by Plaintiff. Defendant 
shall execute any and all documents necessary for transfer of a 
one-half interest in said retirement and/or profit sharing plans 
as of the date of the divorce. 
15. That Defendant should maintain life insurance with his 
employment in the amount of $50,000 with the Plaintiff as the 
named beneficiary as long as there is an alimony obligation. 
16. That each party should pay their own attorney fees and 
costs incurred in this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That Plaintiff should be awarded a decree of divorce 
from the Defendant to become final upon the signing thereof. 
2. That an order should be entered in conformance with the 
foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this ^ day of jfX c-~j£«,~ 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
- T S - W. fUi 
Ben H. Hadfiel'd 7 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, 
postage prepaid, to Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176 
5 
,7^ 
North Main, Suite 102'*," North Logan, UT 84321, this Q ^ day of 
^Lttt'ljUtO , 1993. 
^Secretary ^  /""/*""" 
e:\lwh\pl\comer.fof 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Dadfs kitchen table 
Aunt Lou's tall plant stand 
30-30 with shells 
shotgun with shells 
22 rifle with shells 
plants 
windmills 
sun deck table and chairs 
planters (half of the big ones) 
flowers out of yard 
one-half of the redwood poles 
motorcycle 
dog table 
washer and dryer 
yard tools 
lawnmower 
dishwasher 
bottles for canning 
large cast iron pan 
all my personal items 
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LYLE W. HILLYARD #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSALEE P. COMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAWRENCE J. COMER, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924-201 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 20th day of 
September, 1993, before the Honorable Ben U Hadfield, District 
Court Judge. Personally appeared the Plaintiff and her attorney, 
Lyle W. Hillyard, and the Defendant and his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund, The Court reviewed with I In* parties the pretrial 
order and the stipulated issues. The parties were sworn and 
testified with proffers of evidence and documents were 
introduced. The Court being fully advised in the premises and 
having heretofore made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, makes the following order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That Plaintiff, ROSALEE P. COMER, is awarded a decree of 
divorce from the Defendant, LAWRENCE J. COMER, to become final 
upon the signing hereof. 
case No.$Zj!i2.0 / 
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2. That because of the long term marriage and the 
substantial earning capacity differences between the parties that 
has occurred during the marriage, Plaintiff is entitled to 
permanent alimony that shall terminate upon Plaintiff's death, 
remarriage, or cohabitation, as provided by law. That 
Defendant's gross earnings per month are $1,846 without overtime 
and $3,063 with overtime- That Plaintiff's gross earnings per 
month are $450- Taking into consideration Plaintiff's and 
Defendant's regular salaries and the needs of the parties, 
Defendant is ordered to pay to Plaintiff the sum of $750 a month 
as and for alimony beginning October 1, 1993, with one-half 
payable on the 1st day of the month and one-half payable on the 
15th day of the month until the further order of the Court. 
3. That Plaintiff shall have the option to pick up health 
insurance coverage through Defendant's employment under the COBRA 
provision, with her to pay the premiums for that insurance. 
4. That Defendant shall have the option to buy the home of 
the parties located at 61 East 600 North, Logan, Utah, for 
$61,000, with $30,500 payable to Plaintiff within 30 days from 
the date the Decree of Divorce is entered. Defendant may 
subtract therefrom $150 for her share of the appraisal fee, 
provided he has paid the appraisal fee of $300 to Jack Draxler. 
5. That Defendant has delivered the 1977 motor home to a 
lot where it can be sold professionally. The Defendant shall 
give the Plaintiff notice of any potential buyer and the money 
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offered before he consummates the sale. The net proceeds from 
the sale shall be equally divided between the parties. 
6. That all bank accounts and investments, including IRA, 
credit union, and money market funds, except the Hutton and First 
Capital accounts referred to in paragraph 13, acquired by the 
parties during their marriage shall be divided equally between 
the parties, taking into consideration previous divisions made 
and the best tax implications of those divided. This shall 
include any other cash that may be located by the parties. 
7. That the Plaintiff is awarded the 1978 GMC truck, her 
diamonds, and the items listed on Exhibit "A" attached hereto, 
with Plaintiff to make available to the Defendant the crystal and 
cedar chest now in her possession. Plaintiff shall come to the 
family home on September 25, 1993, at 10:00 a.m. to pick up the 
items on Exhibit "A". 
8. That the Defendant is awarded the 1978 Jeep, the crystal 
that he inherited from his mother, the cedar chest, his mother's 
diamond that is on one band, with the other two bands that make 
the set going to the Plaintiff, his interest in the land and 
improvements in Lehi, Utah, and the items in his possession 
except those that are awarded to the Plaintiff. 
9. That the parties have acquired during their marriage a 
Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate 
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's 
inheritance. Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from 
her family during the course of the marriage which was invested 
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in marital assets. Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant 
with $19,000 in these accounts and the balance of these two 
accounts shall be split between the parties. The Court noted 
that these accounts have been held by the parties for 
approximately 16 years. The accounts have been managed by both 
of parties while owned. Plaintiff's name was on one account. 
The parties have paid taxes generated on the interest from these 
investments from their marital assets, thus converting the 
accumulation in these accounts into marital assets. 
10. That Plaintiff shall be awarded a one-half interest in 
any and all retirement and profit sharing plans which Defendant 
may have through his employment at Schreiber Foods acquired 
during their marriage. Plaintiff's one-half interest shall be 
computed in accordance with the so-called Woodward formula as set 
out in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (1982). In 
addition, Plaintiff is awarded survivor benefits at least 
equivalent in amount to her retirement interest awarded herein, 
the cost of said benefits to be paid by Plaintiff. Defendant 
shall execute any and all documents necessary for transfer of a 
one-half interest in said retirement and/or profit sharing plans 
as of the date of the divorce. 
11. That Defendant is ordered to maintain life insurance 
with his employment in the amount of $50,000 with the Plaintiff 
as the named beneficiary as long as there is an alimony 
obligation. 
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12. That each party is ordered to pay their own attorney 
fees and costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this O day of YJec <*-1*-•' • . 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
ZZ^JLA 
Ben H. Hadfiel 
District Court Judg 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176 North Main, Suite 
102, North Logan, UT 84321, this Q day of November, 1993. 
fecfetary 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Dad's kitchen table 
Aunt Lou's tall plant stand 
30-30 with shells 
shotgun with shells 
22 rifle with shells 
plants 
windmills 
sun deck table and chairs 
planters (half of the big ones) 
flowers out of yard 
one-half of the redwood poles 
motorcycle 
dog table 
washer and dryer 
yard tools 
lawnmower 
dishwasher 
bottles for canning 
large cast iron pan 
all my personal items 
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Lyle W. Hillyard #1494 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, UT 84321 
(801) 752-2610 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROSALEE P. COMER, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
LAWRENCE J. COMER, ] 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
1 Civil No. 924 201 
THIS MATTER came on for hearing on the 6th day of January, 
1994, before the Honorable Gordon J. Low, District Court Judge, 
pursuant to Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. The Plaintiff did 
not appear but was represented by her attorney, Lyle W. Hillyard, 
and the Defendant was present with his attorney, Gregory 
Skabelund. The Court heard the arguments of counsel and being 
fully advised in the premises, makes the following ORDER: 
1. That paragraph 13 of the Findings and paragraph 9 of the 
Decree is amended as follows: 
That the parties have acquired during their marriage a 
Hutton account and a First Capital account with an approximate 
balance of $45,000, $26,000 of that originated by Defendant's 
inheritance. Plaintiff also inherited approximately $7,000 from 
her family during the course of the marriage which was invested 
in marital assets. 'Therefore, the Court credits the Defendant 
with $26,000 in these accounts and the Plaintiff with $7,000.00 
in these accounts and the balance of these two accounts shall be 
split between the parties. The Court noted that these accounts 
have been held by the parties for approximately 16 years. The 
accounts have been managed by both of parties while owned. 
Plaintiff's name was on one account. The parties have paid taxes 
generated on the interest from these investments from their 
marital assets, thus converting the accumulation in these 
accounts into marital assets. 
Dated this i$ day of January, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
/S/ BEN H. HAnpFJD 
tSardon -J;—fcow 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE was mailed, postpaid, to 
Defendant's Attorney, Gregory Skabelund, 2176 North Main, Suite 
102, Logan, UT 84321, this // day of January, 1994. 
Secretary / 
e:\lwh\pl\comer.orl 
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